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I Introduction: The Social Matrix
of Accumulation
In this article we summarise the initial results of
field research on one aspect of civil society which
sprung from conversations with Gordon White
about the politics of markets (White 1993). While
the output of Gordon's work on the politics of civil
society in China ran rapidly to six papers and a
substantial book (White et al. 1996) and then
flowed on into fertile intellectual distributaries:
civil society and democratisation (Luckham and
White 1996; Robinson and White 1998), the poli-
tics of social provision (Goodman et al. 1998) and
the political conditions for effective developmental
states (Luckham and White 1996), our work in
India was small in scope, proceeded comparatively
at a snails pace and has generated but one paper
(Basile and Harriss-White 1999)! Three strands of
Gordon work have been indispensible to the
framework we use to examine the impact of the
politics of urban organisations on accumulation in
South India: civil society, the politics of market
organisation, and corporatism. In this introduc-
tion, we will outline the framework of 'social struc-
tures of accumulation' (henceforth SSA) and weave
in these strands.
While orthodox economics externalises the regula-
tive environment, the school of SSA challenges the
conventional double reductionism of capitalism to
markets and of markets to the economic domain. It
seeks to examine growth and change in capitalist
systems through the complex of social institutions
that enable the collection of factors of production,
the transformation of money into the means of pro-
duction, the organisation of production and the
reconversion of the product into money (Kotz et al.
1994). Institutions and their interrelationships
evolve as a period of accumulation comes into
being and is sustained, but the consolidation of this
institutional matrix has the capacity eventually to
undermine the very system it created. The motors
of accumulation may include: institutions structur-
ing labour and management and those managing
demand and consumption; the character of indus-
trial organisation; the institutions of finance; the
role of the state and of political parties; social insti-
tutions of race and gender and the dominant cul-
ture or ideology At the core of this ambitious
intellectual agenda is a question about how this
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undermines stability, by reducing class conflict,
conflict within capital and conflict between concen-
trations of capital.
In this article, we use this framework to help
answer the following question: within the set of
institutions underpinning capitalist accumulation,
what is the role played by organisations of civil
society? In his political analysis of markets, White
(1993:7) grants civic organisations a prominent role
as shapers of the politics of market organisation.
Here competition is subordinated to collective
action for the purposes of endogenous regulation,
yet these conditions 'protect the market position' of
participants, through unearned rents, to the detri-
ment of those excluded. The balance between posi-
tive (regulatory) and negative (exclusionary) effects
of such organisations, White concluded, 'needs
more thought and investigation' (ibid.). That is our
purpose here. Beforehand, however, we need briefly
to introduce and define other key analytical build-
ing blocks: civil society , caste and corporatism.
1.1 Civil society, caste and corporatism
White et al. define civil society as 'a sphere of free
social interaction and organisation which is separate
and independent of the State' (1996:1). But the term
is heavily contested, depending on the terms of the
juxtaposition of state to civil society (Keane 1988).
To add relevance to our study of civic organisations
and a new structure to the SSA, we need to draw
from Gramsci (1975) the insight that civil society
consists of the political, cultural and ideological
hegemony which a social group exercises over soci-
ety and by means of which the economy is regulated.
The Gramscian concept of civil society combines two
spheres of human life: economic interests and ideol-
ogy The institutions which result (including those
crucial for accumulation) are the outcome not only of
social contradictions and conflicts but also of the ide-
ological factors by which consent is gained and per-
sonal interests are imposed. Ideology then becomes a
major component of the institution-building process.
Two aspects of Indian development - rapid social
and economic change and an increasing social com-
plexity - reinforce the relevance of a Gramscian
approach to SSA. Caste, in both its ideological and its
politically organised forms, is central to both aspects.
Caste is 'a specifically Indian form of civil society',
characterised by both 'continuity and change' (Fuller
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1996). The constraint of caste on Indian economic
performance has long been debated. That economic
liberalisation and more generally modernity will dis-
solve the caste system is now a common insight
(Mendelsohn 1993; Panini 1996; Jayaram 1996),
seeding hypotheses about determinants and conse-
quences. Caste, legitimated directly from, and 'inex-
tricably intertwined with', Hindu religion remains a
foundation of Indian society While castes contribute
to the architecture of Indian civil society each indi-
vidual caste is a 'dynamic force in interest articulation'
(Jayaram 1996). While 'modernisation' has under-
mined or transformed the organisation of caste, it has
also revealed its 'tremendous flexibility' (Jayaram
1996). Caste groups have shifted ritual position due
to the increasing contact of lower castes with the great
Hindu tradition (Karanth 1996). The process
whereby 'a low caste takes over the customs, ritual,
belief, ideology and style of life of a high caste' with
the objective of improving 'the economic and political
position of the group' is called 'Sanskritisation'
(Srinivas 1989:56). Sanskritisation in turn accompa-
nies 'modernisation' by which is meant - very specif-
ically - an increasing dissociation of castes from their
hereditary occupations. The combined effect of 'mod-
ernisation' and of the contested implementation of
positive discrimination via the Reservations policy of
the Indian government has been the emergence of a
'dual culture' (Karanth 1996; Radhakrishnan 1996),
in which a caste attempts to claim a low or backward
status in relation to the state, while claiming and pro-
tecting a high status in relation to society
The secularisation of caste in India has involved a
separation between the Hindu religious sphere and
the social-economic sphere. As Béteille suggests
(1996:158), the caste system has been 'truncated': its
future 'not with religion but with politics'. If 'mod-
ernisation' has reworked caste, the question then is
what kind of political society is currently being
shaped by this transformed institution. The recent
literature shows how caste plays a major continuity
role as the economy diversifies. It is still possible to
observe a caste-clustering in the contemporary dis-
tribution of occupations. But this clustering can be
(and has been) explained by the distribution of skills
and resources, by the imperfections of the labour
markets affecting the control of individuals over
information on economic opportunities, rather than
with reference to the caste hierarchy per se (Panini
1996). In addition, liberalisation has revealed a
deeply segmented social structure in which caste is
connected with networks of other civil organisations
that comprehensively regulate economic and social
life (Uphadya 1997; Reiniche 1996). Distinctions of
status, even if they might still be expressed in the
idiom of caste, are rooted neither in a caste system
nor a caste hierarchy, whose legitimacy has been
eroded, but rather in social groups that are legiti-
mated in economic terms (Fuller 1996).
We can now turn to our hypothesis: that the form of
social regulation emerging from the seculansation of
caste is corporatist. Corporatism is a type of control
over relations between labour, capital and the state,
which is based on a specific economic order that is
compatible with authoritarianism (O'Sullivan 1988).
The play between interest groups defines the associa-
tive order that governs social interaction and shapes
the SSA. The role of the state may vary and a common
distinction is made in the literature between state and
societal corporatism (reviewed in White 1996). In the
first form, the state plays a 'directive' role and domi-
nates its relationship with the associations and the
relationships between associations. In the second
form, theorised by Schmitter (1974) and Cawson
(1985), associations are relatively independent from
the state, which performs the role of 'interest interme-
diation'. The relationships between state and corpo-
ratist associations are based on political exchange.
The typical corporatist political exchange involves
more than one organised interest, and the form of cor-
poratism is tripartite, as state, capital and labour are
involved simultaneously The state is not a neutral
arbiter; instead it is the synthesiser of corporatist
ideals and values, the repositary of a vision of society
in which the power of capital and labour is asyrnmet-
rically distributed and biased towards the former. As
a result, in corporatism, civil society political society
and economy overlap (Mancini et al. 1983).
The neo-corporatist argument is highly relevant to
our project on contemporary India. Organisations of
economic interest may be created and/or controlled
by the state for its own project of accumulation. Such
institutions may not contribute to the democratisation
of society An alternative conception of the role of
institutions of collective economic interest (business
and trade associations), from that of narrow advance-
ment to that of the mediation of potentially conflict-
ing interest, is opened up. And attention is drawn in
the concrete circumstances of South India to the rela-
tionship between caste as a means of organising occu-
pation and its evolving relation to the state.
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2 The Town
Our empirical material is of two types: a series of three
field enquiries into the organisation of local urban
capital, labour, commodities and into their politics by
means of business histories obtained from random 6
per cent samples of commercial enterprises in
1973-4, 1982-4 and 1993-4 (Harriss 1991); and a
systematic set of histories, gathered in 1997, of almost
all the groups and associations with which the busi-
ness economy of a small town is linked and in which
it is embedded: market and political institutions, civil
society organisations and associations.
The market town is Ami, located in northern Tamil
Nadu and acting as a central place for more than a
hundred villages. It is 150 kms southwest of
Chennai with an economic base of administration,
commerce (increasingly wholesale), paddy-trading
and -milling, and silk-saree weaving. Five per cent
of its population is agricultural. Its population has
grown from some 39,000 in 1971 to 49,000 in
1981 and 55,000 in 1991. The municipality, cre-
ated in 1951 and converted to grade 2 status in
1971, has already engulfed eleven revenue villages.
In fact the population directly associated with Arni
urban economy is likely to approach 100,000; the
census population being inflated by transients and
by regular commuting from its ring of satellite vil-
lages (which resist incorporation into the munici-
pality because of the increases this would make in
local taxation - a situation which makes local urban
government relatively chronically underfunded).
During the last twenty years the number of busi-
nesses visible to our census record in Ami has tre-
bled. By late 1993 the transformation in its
economic base over the previous decade had been
nothing short of astonishing. A number of agricul-
tural and 'traditional' artisan activities had declined
significantly or disappeared altogether. Agricultural
inputs firms had stagnated (as had agricultural pro-
duction). The activities comprising the economic
base ten and twenty years ago had consolidated
their position: rice mills had doubled in number, as
had food wholesaling firms and durable consumer
goods retail units. Urban silk manufacturing units
had increased by 50 per cent and spilled massively
into the countryside. Deregulation had led to a
threefold increase in fuel depots and increased
urban and rural incomes had generated demand for
a thirtyfold increase in businesses dealing in non-
food agricultural products.
New businesses attest not only to the metropolitani-
sation of economy and culture but to its rapid global-
isation. Brand new telecommunications technologies
have appeared: satellite and cable TV (and ways to
poach it) and new telecommunications rental markets
have spread throughout the urban area along with
courier services, xerox and video libraries. The town
can now give up to 20,000 'doses' of cinema per day
The explosion of finance companies and chit funds -
many not registered, many run with black money -,
the appearance of insurance, stocks and share dealing
services, specialised commercial agencies for corpo-
rate industry architectural, accountancy and real
estate professions attest to the emergence of si.zeable
elite markets. Tuition centres, typing and computing
institutes and students' hostels indicate new patterns
of skill acquisition and freedom for young people
(although the town is extremely underdeveloped with
respect to education). Auto sales and rentals, tourist
car and van hire businesses have responded to local
piety curiosity and incomes (for tourism is inextrica-
bly linked with pilgrimages and shrine-hopping).
Prominent expansions of hotels, bakeries and sweets
stalls and booths indicate new patterns of commen-
sality Modernisation has not simplified the institu-
tional fabric. Quite the reverse. All these
developments have added to the institutional com-
plexity of the town. But while in terms of numbers of
enterprises the town appears a model of a growth cen-
tre, the prevalence and distribution of black finance
capital suggests that there is a substantial element of
accumulation which is non-productive. From field
research we estimate that the output from trade and
the income from finance equals or exceeds that from
productive industry in Ami.
The vast mass of businesses are family firms with
small labour forces. The average number of liveli-
hoods (7 to 8 per firm) has not changed much over
the period 1973-93. The proportion of purely fam-
ily firms (petty commodity producers and traders)
has risen from 28 per cent to 35 per cent over the
twenty-year period, while the proportion of family
labour in the entire labour force has remained static
at around a quarter. The composition of this work
force has changed with the entry of female family
members of all castes. The mills, however, have
become increasingly 'satanic' over time, through the
See Basile and Harriss-White 1999, footnote 19, p. t6,
for a discussion of caste nomenclature.
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casualisation of their labour force. Casual labour
increased from 23 per cent of jobs to 57 per cent
between 1973 and 1993.
'Forward caste' control over business is stable in
absolute terms and its apparent proportional decline
masks the massive increase in the concentration of its
capital.1 'Backward castes' have gained ground as
owners, while 'most backward castes' and 'scheduled
castes' make up around 80 per cent of the casual
labour force. Ten to 15 per cent of firms still only
employ labour of their own caste. In the great major-
ity of firms, workers form an emulsion of caste. In the
nineties, the town has been swept by a new wave of
'primitive' accumulation in two senses of the term:
though capitalist production relations have been long
entrenched, each individual capitalist has to develop
their own starting point for accumulation; and a sig-
nificant element in these initial resources, even when
acquired in the modem economy, is obtained in
'primitive' ways through economic crime, fraud and
corruption (Harriss-White 1996).
3 The Politics of Accumulation in
Ami
Our empirical material shows that Amis economy has
lately been organised into a large number of private
and state institutions (66), covering all aspects of social
and economic life, and regulating it at the levels of the
(male) individual, the household and the collective.
Public service and public sector unions, together with
some of the politically militant but numerically small
service castes, were the first institutions to be created
in the early part of the century Over half have
appeared since 1980, and 35 per cent in the nineties,
based on new principles of organisation: new political
parties, town level, cross-caste organisations, trade
associations for new goods and services, organisations
for scheduled castes and a handful for women. Many
associations have a cross-class nature and (male) indi-
viduals participate irrespective of their class position.
This is most obvious in the caste-cum-occupational
associations but holds for others, particularly welfare
and charitable organisations. Most crucially the inter-
ests of culture and religion come to be organised in
part through caste associations. Then such organisa-
tions come to reflect not only culture and religion but
also political and business objectives. Indeed, the lat-
ter come to dominate the organisations, and the urban
economy cannot operate without them.
There is a strong ideological element to these groups.
Alongside a regulative economic agenda and claims
from the state, practically every caste association aims
to improve their own welfare and solidarity, repro-
ducing within a caste an echo of the distributional
rules that formerly operated between castes in this
region. Groups representing more economically
powerful interests also aim to improve, or to be seen
to improve, the welfare of the town itself, albeit
through small acts of redistributive charity which are
also open to interpretation as legitimating accumula-
tion. These attempts at self-regulation and economic
governance are supported by a widespread ideology
that conceals class interests under the veil of the
wider interest of the 'community'. It is worth stress-
ing that the strength of 'town-unity' extends across
religions. Of some significance is the role of Muslim
businessmen, not only as Muslims but also as busi-
nessmen, as representatives of the town and as col-
lective investors in (secular) educational
infrastructure egregiously neglected by the state.
A very crucial pillar of the ideology in which the town
is a 'unified body' - and part of the SSA fabric - is
caste, which to date is showing no sign of the erosion
foreseen by Panini and others. Instead, caste is being
selectively reworked to mean different things at dif-
ferent positions in the economic system of the town.
Among 'scheduled castes' and 'most backward castes',
caste remains a condition of hierarchy in which
higher castes are repelled from low caste occupations,
irs which access to higher caste occupations is pre-
vented and in which caste cannot even be used as an
idïom in the organisations struggling for income and
status. By contrast, among 'backward castes', caste is
more a matter of difference, economically competitive
and increasingly internally differentiated. Here we see
the contradictions of practices signifying a rise in sta-
tus on the one hand, and pressure on the state to
lower status for the purposes of positive discrimina-
tion on the other. At the top, caste ceases to have a
role to play in formal economic regulation, though it
certainly does not cease to have a role in economic
and social life outside that of the regulative group. So
An order entrusted to the state in the Italian case
(Mancini et al., 1983).
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there is a distinct interplay between the economy and
caste (and caste-based occupational) associations,
which shows the flexibility of caste, the reworking
and distancing between caste and religion and the
adding of economic regulative functions, both to the
institution of caste per se and particularly to its formal
associations. For if castes are 'truncated and secu-
larised' institutions which have lost their religious
bearings, they are ineluctably vital as regulators of the
economy It seems that the sanskritising agenda of the
caste associations has been sacrificed on the altar of
the economy
The interplay between caste and the economy may be
differentiated, but it is consistent with corporatism.
Corporatism, let us recapitulate, limits class conflict
inter alla by involving both capital and labour in the
'self government' of the economy It rests on two pil-
lars, one institutional and one ideological. Together
they impregnate production relations to generate the
overlap between economy and society that is the dis-
tinctive feature of corporatism. In this, we think caste
plays a triple role. First, it provides an ideological
backcloth for the corporatist 'project'. At the same time
it generates, and is consistent with the formalisation of,
the institutional structure on the back of which corpo-
ratist organisations have evolved. In this urban society,
caste still supplies the hierarchical order.2 Through
caste, the link between ideology and institutions is
particularly strong. The ideology itself, in distinguish-
ing castes, is the source of the institutions - caste and
closely-related, finely-defined occupational associa-
tions. Furthermore, caste helps in the creation of the
conditions for the overlap between economy and soci-
ety that is necessary to the working of the corporatist
project. The corporatist ideological and institutional
framework imprints production relations, the main
features of which can be distinguished according to:
(1) class relations; (2) gender; (3) the local territorial
organisation of the urban economy; and 4) relations
between the urban economy and the state.
3.1 Capitallabour relations
The town is organised according to the needs of
'big' local capital. However, 'big' local capital does
not act in concert, but is divided by commodity and
by caste. It is not weakened by such a political con-
figuration. Rather, the latter may be seen as the
hydra-headed alignments of a numerically small
sector so as ro maximise tactical advantages.
Witness for example the ubiquitous attempts col-
lectively to regulate and control, via the state where
necessary, the matrices of market exchange in
which these firms are embedded: those for raw
materials, money, rates in derived markets and most
particularly labour. The modalities of labour control
include wage rates but also the means of increasing
absolute surplus value (the terms and conditions of
work, the length of the working day and week, the
extent and periodicity of holidays, the use of female
and child labour). Through this control, capital is
able to transform labour productivity extensively
and without a rise in mass consumption. In so
doing, capital frequently flouts the laws regulating
and protecting labour. At the same time accumula-
tion is permeated with petty crime and with wide-
spread fraud, particularly with respect to every
aspect of taxation.
Labour is weak and not organised. Independent trade
unions are almost non-existent and party political
support is opportunistic. Associations of low castes
and workers' unions are no different from big com-
modity associations in this respect. There is no organ-
ised complaint or rebellion about working conditions,
in spite of the fact that, as the major business associa-
tions reported, the town is close to full employment.
A modem proverb has it that 'Caste is the strongest
trade union', but even among low caste workers, caste
is not organising 'labour' as opposed to 'capital'. In
certain castes, occupations with a long history of
caste-identification are vigorously defended for a mix-
ture of purposes, such as social identity, insurance,
trust and economic reputation, job security and
credit, but extremely rarely for class identity The
commodity branding of many of the backward castes
signals the relative status of the traders and the traded.
But it cames no necessary implications for class posi-
tion. Capital is blind to caste as it transforms the pro-
duction and circulation of commodities. Caste has
become an instrument to regulate workers' participa-
tion in the economy, rather than to legitimate
caste/class opposition or to position people in a rank-
ing of ritual status. There is then a sort of structural
disequilibrium between capital and labour as far as
class consciousness ïs concerned: the capitalist class
has a strong identity that is reinforced by convic-
tions about the duties of the local elites in promoting
urban welfare; while labour has a very weak percep-
tion of its class identity due to the absence of political
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representation and to the pervasive presence of caste.
But there are institutions other than caste which struc-
ture accumulation and with which caste is more or
less entwined: gender, locality and the state.
3.2 Gender
While just under half the workforce is female, while a
handful of businesses are managed by women, prac-
tically no business is owned by women, and corporate
associational life is intensely male. Educated women,
extremely few of whom are 'scheduled caste' benefi-
ciaries of Christian educations and even fewer of
whom are 'backward caste', have economic niches in
clerical jobs in local government, medicine, teaching,
and a toehold in the professions. It is very rare to find
a woman lawyer or member of the police force. Those
with other skills, such as computing, work in organ-
ised-sector firms outside the locality, on the outer
periphery of Amis collective life. Their role is con-
fined to buttressing the ideological legitimation of the
business/caste elite through cross-caste and class phil-
anthropy Women are but tiny minorities in a few
caste and trade associations and where they form an
important proportion, their corporate affairs are man-
aged by men, just as the interests of labour are fre-
quently managed by capital. As labour, women are
deliberately casualised and attempts to organise them
are crushed, Urban civil society therefore tends
towards the reinforcement of patriarchy in the market
economy By contrast, it is the Dravidian state which
has provided opportunities for the relative empower-
ment of women, through education and through
employment, though women are still conspicuous by
their absence in the higher administrative echelons.
3.3 Locality
There are two aspects of locality which shape the
organisation of the economy First, since the tidal
wave of commercial capitalist expansion in the
1960s, the town has organised itself as a social unit
across caste and to a lesser extent across class and
gender. But the purposes of this unity have evolved
from being socially redistributivist and legitimating,
via the accretion of enabling and claiming activity, to
substituting for the state. In its new, composite role,
'town unity' is pitted against the state as much as
providing a crutch for it. The second aspect of the
organisation of locality concerns its spatio-political
dynamics. Those civil-social organisations which are
not federated operate politically at the level of local
municipal government, exerting vigilance on the
local state and demanding infrastructure. But the
majority of civil social organisations are components
of hierarchical federations with their apexes in state
or national capitals. This has two further conse-
quences: local organisations have access to higher
levels of skill and resources in their political and eco-
nomic projects; and they may also be construed as
conduits of information and instructions from head-
quarters andlor mobilised reactively in a competitive
political arena located outside the town.
3.4 State
The economic role of civil-social organisations is
part self-regulative, but for the most part directed
towards the state. The state in the town is empow-
ered to organise, mediate, protect, regulate and
redistribute economic resources. In so doing it
redistributes economic power between the genders,
shapes the fortunes of castes, creates and regulates
classes and formalises locality If it ever was a secu-
lar institution, it is definitely being desecularised in
the current era. Its efficacy is being shaped by the
private social status of its officials (Harriss-White,
forthcoming). At the same time, it is also riddled
with incompetence, arbitrariness and oppressive
practices. Private interest and private discretionary
power generates corruption. So also does the party-
political capture of bureaucratic allocative power ïn
rivers of private tribute based upon departmental
co-option. More quantitatively important than cor-
ruption is fraud, in which benefits are shared
between individual politicians and the local busi-
ness elite. Clearly, this is a collaborative state. But
one thing its collaboration does not involve is con-
trol over the civil-social institutions described here.
Yet it is this state to which political appeal is made
through caste and trade associations. Seven aspects
to this set of claims appear from our empirical mate-
rial: (i) prices and subsidies to combat the unruliness
of market exchange; (ii) regulation (particularly of
urban space, while other aspects of the state's regula-
tion of markets are energetically contested); (iii)
direct commercial intervention (trading in raw mate-
rials or finished products, regulation of access, terms
and conditions of finance and loans); (iv) infrastruc-
ture (not only physical infrastructure but also finan-
cial and social); (y) caste reservations and
employment; (vi) collusion over control of labour;
(vii) taxation. The sites, scales and political outcomes
of these seven fronts for civic contestation vary. But as
long as the state is embroiled in these struggles, and
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from our evidence its role is intensifying rather than
declining over the decade of liberalisation, there will
persist not only the well chronicled tension between
political inclusion and economic exclusion, but also
the less acknowledged tensions about the terms of
political inclusion. These terms require the state to
have an active redistributive role in the economy
An increasingly restive political society with new, and
newly assertive parties, with organisations represent-
ing lower castes and with the democratic formal
structure of authority found in many organisations,
does not necessarily mean that civil society is democ-
ratising. Instead, as electoral democracy deepens, a
politics other than party-electoral politics is emerging
in which caste rather than class plays the mobilising
role. Electoral politics is suffused with caste competi-
tion and caste blocs. Party political alignment and
caste compete as principles for votes. The town is at
a stage in its political development when an increas-
ingly caste-based electoral politics takes the shape of
'capitalist business', requiring private investment,
employing labour and yielding returns - not simply
through the crude and time-bound mechanism of
votes, but through the infinitely more subtle and
enduring returns, to corrupt intermediation, fraud,
non-compliance and contractual allocations that are
possible once in power.
4 Conclusion
So Amis societal corporatist form of accumulation
accords with Gramsci's concept of civil society In
Amis civil society we have found the political, cul-
tural and ideological hegemony of a single social
group - the capitalist class - over the entire society
This class exerts its hegemony with the important
support of a strong ideology based on transforma-
tions to the institution of caste. Due to the rein-
forcement of caste, patriarchy and the rhetoric of
town unity, economic interests and ideological fac-
tors overlap in exactly the manner Gramsci thought
to be the essence of civil society In this sense, the
institutional framework of civil society is the out-
come of social contradictions and conflicts, which
are resolved thanks to an ideological framework,
the main role of which is to gain consent for the
hegemonic project of the local capitalist class.
Through the caste system and through patriarchy,
ideology comes to form a significant component in
the local social structures of accumulation.
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